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Accounting Practice Pointers:
No. 1 of a Series

EVALUATING AND AVOIDING
THE SUIT FOR FEES
Suits by CPAs for their fees have resulted in a mixed
bag of success and disaster. Before filing suit subtract
the time and expense of litigation from your probable
recovery and then weigh the risk of a counterclaim
which will itself require time and attention. Where
numerous suits for fees seem indicated, an adjust
ment in your billing and collection practices may be
indicated.
Time and Expense of Litigation
The American rule requires that all parties pay
their own attorneys’ fees. Unless your engagement
letter contains an unusual clause providing that the
client will pay reasonable attorney fees and collec
tion costs, you will have to bear them thus reducing
any recovery by one-third or more.
Whenever a lawsuit is filed, it is standard proce
dure to send written interrogatories to the other side.
This means you will have to sit down with your
attorneys and file sworn answers and the time this
takes will depend upon the complexity of the issues.
Another standard procedure is to take the deposition
of the parties which involves orally answering ques
tions under oath before a court reporter. At this time
you will probably be required to produce your work
ing papers for inspection. You will need to prepare for
the deposition and meet at the appointed time and
place so that this could easily cost you a half day of
billable time.
If the suit for your fee is defended, you will have to
go to court. In small claims and other courts this may
mean sitting and waiting until your case is called. The
simplest case could involve loss of a half day here.
However, obtaining a judgment for your fee gives no
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Audit Confirmation of Payables May
Result in Liability for the Client:
Buxton v. Diversified Resources Corp.,
634 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1980).

Facts
Plaintiff sued on a $20,000 loan and the defendant
corporation asserted the Utah statute of limitations as
a defense to the claim. From 1971 through 1973 audit
confirmation letters had been signed by the controller
for the $20,000 obligation. In 1974 and 1975 the presi
dent signed letters in the following form requesting
confirmation to the auditors of an obligation of
$20,000 plus interest:
Our auditors are making an examination of our
financial statements which indicate the following
amount payable to you on notes:...Please confirm
the accuracy of the above information.

Outcome
The court held:
• The president had authority to sign the audit con
firmations.
• The confirmations constituted a written acknowl
edgement of the debt which extended the statute of
limitations.
• The debtor corporation was estopped from assert
ing the statute of limitations defense because the
obligor had been lulled into inaction.
The court based its decision on Victory Investment
Corp. v. Muskogee Electric Traction Co., 150 F.2d 889
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945), which,
applying Oklahoma law, held that submitting a bal
ance sheet to the trustee for bondholders showing the
obligation as a current liability extended the statute of
limitations on the bonds.
(continued on page 4)
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SUIT FOR FEES (continued from page 1)

assurance that you will collect. Courthouses are full
of uncollected judgments. If the judgment debtor is
out of business or operates from hand to mouth so
there are no visible bank accounts, receivables, or
assets subject to sheriff’s sale, you may never collect
the judgment.
Litigation is often a slow process that takes months
or years to conclude. Consider that your time must be
expended now while any collection may be long de
layed in evaluating an amicable settlement for less
than the full amount.

Risk of Counterclaims
It is standard practice to file a counterclaim for
deficient work whenever a CPA sues for a fee. In order
to avoid payment of the fee the client must show that
the work was so poor that it lacked any substantial
value. Other damages, depending upon the circum
stances, may include defalcation losses, IRS penal
ties, or professional fees to correct resulting prob
lems. In order to recover damages the client must
show a loss caused by your failure to use the usual
procedures employed by the average CPA in your
community. However, the counterclaim risk cannot
be ignored. For example, in the case of Ryan v. Kanne,
120 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), the CPA recovered a fee
of over $3,000 but had to pay a malpractice claim of
over $23,000. The risk of a successful counterclaim is
greatly increased if money changed hands based on
either audited or unaudited financial statements. In
the Ryan v. Kanne case the unaudited balance sheet
was the basis for investing in a newly formed corpora
tion.
Defalcations are an important cause of malpractice
losses for the small CPA firm. While a CPA should
think twice about suit for a fee where a defalcation
has taken place, the inherent uncertainties in litiga
tion and the variety of factual possibilities do not
permit statement of a general rule. Thus in O’Neal v.
Atlas Automobile Finance Corporation, 11 A.2d 782
(Pa. Super. 1940), the jury found for the CPA on the
claim for unpaid fee and against the defendant’s
counterclaim for negligent failure to discover the
bookkeeper’s fraud. However, the pertinent question
is considering the time, expense, and worry, was it
really worth it?
One problem presented by a counterclaim is that it
is a suit for malpractice. All malpractice policies
require notice to the insurance carrier upon any claim
or occurrence which may lead to a claim. If you fail to
notify your carrier, then you are uninsured because of
a breach of a condition in the policy. On the other
hand, notice to the carrier means the carrier must
defend the counterclaim. Numerous counterclaims
can result in expenses leading to loss of malpractice
coverage or being placed in an assigned risk pool at
higher insurance rates for less coverage. One attorney
says he advises the client that he can defend the
counterclaim as part of the suit for the fee so that
notice to the carrier is not necessary. However, if the

counterclaim results in a judgment, it will be unin
sured.
Where the facts indicate a minimal risk for a suc
cessful counterclaim, suit for the fee may be bene
ficial especially in the unusual case where the en
gagement letter provides for collection of attorneys’
fees and costs.
Practice Management
Weekly Billings. While CPAs advise others on set
ting credit limits and establishing current billing
practices, they sometimes neglect such matters in
managing their own practice. A good internal ac
counting system for charges to clients is important to
efficient billing and collection. Weekly progress bill
ings can be a major step in avoiding the suit for fees.
One San Francisco sole practitioner recounts that he
has never lost a fee in thirty years of practice. He
always gets a retainer in advance, used to close the
last progress billing, and requires the client to sign an
engagement letter providing for payment of costs of
collection including attorneys’ fees. He says his basic
rule is: “If I don’t get a check on Friday, I don’t go to
work on Monday.”
Promissory Notes. Another effective procedure is
to require the client to sign a promissory note for past
due balances. This constitutes an admission by the
client that the amount is owed and poses a much
easier collection problem than suit on an account.
One Baltimore CPA says “We got the idea for notes on
past due balances when the interest rates went so
high.” The standard note requires interest and pay
ment of costs of collection including attorneys’ fees.
One national firm (not Big Eight) provides in the
engagement letter that the client agrees to sign a note
on past due balances. A suit on a note is not consid
ered a suit for a fee when applying for malpractice
insurance under the AICPA sponsored plan.
Some CPAs now require interest on past due bal
ances in the engagement letter. For examples of this
practice see “Carrying Charges on Receivables,” Jour
nal of Accountancy, July 1981, p. 50 and “Carrying
Charges on Past-Due Receivables,” Journal of Ac
countancy, January 1981, p. 34. One CPA relates that
while the engagement letter does not provide for in
terest, the firm practice is to add 1½ percent per
month through the accounts receivable billing proce
dures and that generally such amounts are collected.
Remember that AICPA Ethics Rules (ET § 191.103)
require that the audit fee for last year’s engagement
must be completed by the end of field work while SEC
rules require payment of an audit fee prior to starting
the next audit.
Retention of Client Records. One problem that fre
quently arises is that the CPA refuses to surrender
working papers to a successor because the fee is un
paid. Under AICPA Ethics Ruling 505-1, the CPA must
furnish to the client upon request any working papers
(or copies) that constitute client books and records

(continued on page 3)
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regardless of whether the fee is paid. This includes
working papers that substitute for journals and
ledgers as well as adjusting and closing entries and
supporting computations such as a depreciation
schedule. The California State Board strictly enforces
this rule by virtue of its own rule 68.

Summary and Conclusion
Before filing suit against a client for a fee you
should consider the probable net recovery after de
ducting for the expense of litigation including the
value of your own time. Then weigh this net recovery
against the risk of a counterclaim and the reporting
requirements of your malpractice insurance. Con

sider that litigation takes months or years while your
time outlay will start now.
If you find yourself in the position of suing for
numerous large unpaid fee balances, you should
question your own practice management. Consider

• advance retainers used to close the last progress
billing
• weekly progress billings
• interest on past due balances
• engagement letters providing for costs of collection
and attorneys’ fees
• engagement letters requiring promissory notes on
past due balances.

Accounting Firm Defenses:
No. 1 of a Series

COMPLIANCE WITH “USUAL” PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE AS A MALPRACTICE DEFENSE

While accountants, like other professionals, must
use due professional care, they do not guarantee their
work. Clients are not entitled to perfection nor to the
care, competence, and judgment provided by the best
CPAs. Professional accountants undertake to provide
only the usual care and competence applied by the
average CPA in the local community. These princi
ples apply alike to all functional areas of practice
whether auditing, tax return preparation, tax advice,
investment advice, or accounting services.
Auditing
CPAs do not guarantee the figures on audited finan
cial statements. For example, in Delmar Vineyard v.
Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. App. 1972), there
was evidence that the CPA omitted some payables
and used an excessively high percentage in convert
ing the value of the store’s retail inventory to cost. In
rejecting the malpractice claim, the court said:
Generally, it is established law throughout this
country that an accountant does not guarantee cor
rect judgment, or even the best professional judg
ment, but merely reasonable care and compe
tence ...
The standard of care applicable to the conduct of
audits by public accountants is the same as that
applied to doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers
and others furnishing skilled services for compen
sation and that standard requires reasonable care
and competence therein.

Tax Return Preparation
CPAs do not guarantee the accuracy of tax returns
which they prepare. In Lindner v. Barlow, Davis &
Wood, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. App. 1963), the CPAs
prepared federal income tax returns for five years
relying upon W-2 forms that payments received were

taxable. The payments were voluntary on behalf of
Hearst Corporation which had employed taxpayer’s
deceased husband. When the widow read of a tax
court decision indicating that such payments were
not taxable, she filed a claim for refund on the three
open years and sued the CPAs for income taxes paid
in the two closed years. In their defense the CPAs
proved with expert testimony that the “usual” prac
tice among CPAs in San Francisco was to accept the
W-2 form as evidence of whether payments were taxa
ble. In rejecting the malpractice claim, the court
quoted the following:
Accountants have been recognized as a skilled
professional class... subject generally to the same
rules of liability for negligence in the practice of
their profession as are members of other skilled
professions....
They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill
and competence of members of their profession,
and a failure to discharge that duty will subject
them to liability for negligence. Those who hire
such persons are not justified in expecting infalli
bility, but can expect only reasonable care and com
petence. They purchase service, not insurance.
As further authority that accountants do not guar
antee the accuracy of tax returns that they prepare,
consider the case of Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P2d 685
(Cal. 1961}, where the California Supreme Court ruled
that attorneys are liable for negligence to the benefici
aries under a will. However, in rejecting the malprac
tice claim the court held that where the will failed
because of a technicality, the attorney was not liable.
It ruled:
The attorney is not liable for every mistake he may
make in his practice; he is not, in the absence of an
express agreement, an insurer of the soundness of

(continued on page 4}
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his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that
he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being
in error as to a question of law on which reasonable
doubt may be entertained by well-informed law
yers.... These principles are equally applicable
whether the plaintiff’s claim is based on tort or
breach of contract.

Tax Advice
CPAs who give tax advice are not necessarily liable
for malpractice when the advice proves wrong. For
example, in Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973), aff’d per
curiam, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974), a lawyer advised
that a Louisiana judgment of possession would not
trigger the alternate valuation date for an estate for
federal tax purposes. The real estate was sold and the
estate tax return was filed using the alternate valua
tion date. Following the filing of this return, a lower
federal court in Louisiana ruled that a judgment of
possession established the latest alternate valuation
date that could be used. The heirs then sued the
attorney for malpractice for the additional taxes that
would result from disallowance of the alternate valua
tion date. In rejecting the malpractice claim, the court
noted that other attorneys practicing in the same area
were advising their clients to the same effect and
quoted this from a North Carolina case:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest
belief that his advice and acts are well founded and
in the best interest of his client is not answerable for
a mere error of judgment or for a mistake on a point
of law which has not been settled by the court of
last resort in his State and on which reasonable
doubt may be entertained by well-informed law
yers.
Investment Advice
A CPA who acts as an investment advisor does not
guarantee that the advice will prove beneficial. For
example, in Midland National Bank of Minneapolis.
v. Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1980), the CPA
solicited investments in a partnership tax shelter
from nonclients. In rejecting the investors’ claims
against the CPA, the court acknowledged that finan
cial projections are actionable in fraud if they do not
“accurately reflect surrounding past and present cir
cumstances.” The court held:
He [the CPA] was bound to exercise care in recom
mending a particular investment, but he cannot
have expected to guarantee its soundness. Thirdparty plaintiffs were aware that the success of Stone
House as a business venture was dependent upon
the market price of cattle. In 1971, the market price
of cattle was increasing, and the evidence suggests
that at the time Stone House was a sound invest
ment. Stone House failed because from early 1974
until early 1975 the market price of cattle fell cata
strophically. It would be unreasonable, in our view,
for a jury to find that in 1971 Lurie could have
foreseen this occurrence.
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Accounting Services
The CPA performing accounting services is respon
sible only for the standard of care usually applied by
CPAs in similar circumstances. Thus in O’Neal v.
Atlas Automobile Finance Corp., 11 A.2d 782 (Pa.
Super. 1940) the jury found the CPA not liable for
failing to discover the bookkeeper’s embezzlement
since, contrary to the client’s contention, only a lim
ited examination and financial review was
contemplated in the engagement. Similarly in
Ronaldson v. Moss Watkins, Inc., 127 So. 467 (La.
App. 1930) the CPA was held not liable for errors since
a detailed audit was not contemplated in the engage
ment. It is important to recognize, however, that some
courts have held CPAs performing accounting ser
vices liable for failure to discover embezzlement: 1136
Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg Er Co., 330 N.Y.S.2d
800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (preparing unaudited finan
cials); Bonhiverv. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976)
(bookkeeping services).

Summary and Conclusion
CPAs do not guarantee the accuracy of audited fi
nancial statements, the accuracy of tax returns, nor
the wisdom of their tax or investment advice.
However, in order to avoid misunderstandings in this
regard, many CPAs feel it is prudent practice to warn
clients:
• An audit is designed to search for material fraud but,
because of inherent limitations in any audit, it may
not be relied upon to uncover material fraud.
• Tax return preparation involves numerous grey zone
items subject to resolution against the taxpayer.
• Tax and investment advice is always subject to risks
as enumerated and explained.
• Accounting services are performed on a best efforts
basis and it is not generally possible to guarantee
specific results.

IMPLICATIONS OF COURT DECISIONS

(continued from page 1)

Implications for Auditors
Audit confirmation of payables may result in ex
tending or reviving debts that may otherwise be
barred by the statute of limitations. When confirming
payables, auditors may want to consider whether the
audit client has valid reasons for contesting a claim
and whether the confirmation might waive this of
several defenses that the client may wish to assert. In
making such a determination it may be helpful to
consult the client’s counsel.

RECENT COURT DECISIONS

Accounting Firm Liable for Tax
Opinion Letter: Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied,
Coopers & Lybrand v. Sharp,
No. 81-433, 2/22/82
An accounting firm was held liable on its tax opin
ion letter used in selling limited partnership tax shel
ters. Liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was based on respondent supe
rior and the accounting firm’s strict duty to supervise
employees drafting and issuing such a letter. Because
the tax opinion letter allegedly contained both omis
sions and misrepresentations, the court held that
plaintiffs were entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reliance upon the letter.
The measure of damages was defined as the amount
of money paid by each investor minus the value the
investment would have had if all facts known to the
Coopers & Lybrand employee had been disclosed.
The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment
interest and rejected the accounting firm’s argument
that it did not have the use of plaintiff’s money during
the relevant time period. The court apparently never
resolved the common law fraud claims which, ac
cording to its note 3, depended on the particular law
of each state since the jury found the injury was not
foreseeable to the accounting firm.

$80 Million Verdict Against
Arthur Andersen & Co. Reduced
Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
98,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The trial court has now reduced the $80.7 million
jury award but denied a new trial in a case involving
allegations that an auditor knew, but failed to dis
close, that one client was defrauding another client.
Focusing on a particular clause in the engagement
letter, the court said: “AA’s failure to disclose to FOF
any irregularities actually discovered in the course of
its audit is a breach of a specific, material term of the
engagement letter.”

Courts Split As to Whether Sale of
100% of Stock Is Sale of a Security
It is important for accountants to recognize the
“sale of a security” which may invoke liabilities or
registration requirements under federal securities
laws as well as state blue sky laws. In SEC v. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that units of a citrus grove development, coupled with
a contract for cultivating, marketing, and remitting of
net proceeds were securities. The court reasoned that
form must be disregarded for substance and that a
security is “a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common

FREQUENT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ABOUT THE AICPA PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE PLAN
By William J. Crowe II
Senior Vice President
Rollins Burdick Hunter Co.,
Call toll free: 800-221-4722

Why should I join the AICPA plan?
CPAs need a stable insurance plan at reasonable
rates to guard against malpractice losses. More than
10,000 practice units from all 50 states have joined
together in your AICPA plan to broadly spread the
risk for the mutual defense and protection of all. The
plan is operated under the oversight of the AICPA
Professional Liability Insurance Plan Committee
whose members are drawn from smaller CPA firms
just like yours.
We think the AICPA plan offers the broadest
coverage you can find at competitive costs. Courts
hold local CPA firms liable under federal securities
laws when securities (such as limited partnerships)
are being sold despite exemption from SEC filings.
Your AICPA plan covers liability under federal se
curities laws while some may exclude it. Under the
AICPA plan, you can obtain coverage for acts that
occur prior to joining the plan while other plans may
not offer this option.
How do I join the AICPA plan?
Just call me on the toll free line 800-221-4722 and I
will quote representative rates and arrange to enroll
you in the plan. You can write me at Rollins Burdick
Hunter Co., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158.

What do I do if I anticipate
that I may have a claim?
Your policy requires immediate notice in writing of
any claims or occurrences that may give rise to a
claim. This includes informal indications that trouble
may be coming. Write down your name, address, and
policy number and a narrative statement and mail it
to:
Crum & Forster Insurance Companies
℅ L. W. Biegler Inc.
100th Floor—Sears Tower
233 S. Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606
If you need immediate advice, call L. W. Biegler Inc.
collect at (312) 876-3100.
Remember that your policy provides: “The insured
shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make
any payment, assume any obligation or incur any
expense.” Never admit being at fault and do not agree
to pay damages nor assume responsibility. Leave eval
uation and negotiation to experts provided by your
insurance plan.

(continued on page 6)
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enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of a third party.” Limited partnership interests
are generally held to be securities. In Nor-Tex Agen
cies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1973), the
court held that sales of fractional undivided oil and
gas interests constituted sales of securities subject to
antifraud provisions of federal securities laws.
In Sprague v. Touche Ross & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 98,354 (D. Mass. 1981), the court refused to dis
miss a claim under federal securities laws relating to
a demand note and convertible promissory notes. The
court held that these might be securities if the facts
show that (1) payment was to be dependent upon the
success of a risky enterprise, or (2) the parties con
templated an indefinite extension of the note or con
version into stock. Similarly, in Exchange National
Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross Er Co., 544 F.2d 1126
(2d Cir. 1976) the court rejected the defense that three
notes aggregating $1 million issued to finance a bro
kerage firm were not securities. The court conceded
that home mortgages, consumer loans, and notes for
malizing open accounts were not securities.
Compare Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell Er Co., 626 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1980), where the
court dismissed a section 10(b) Exchange Act claim
holding that a contract for the sale of a real estate tract
was not a “security” simply because it provided for
periodic payments. The contract failed to meet the
three requisites for a security since: (1) it was a com
mercial transaction and not an investment, (2) there
was no common enterprise simply because of peri
odic payments, and (3) profits did not derive solely
from a third party.
In Canfield v. Rapp Er Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th
Cir. 1981), a case not involving accountants, the court
held that the sale of the entire corporate stock did not
fall within federal or Indiana securities laws. The
new Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta agreed in its decision
of King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982).
However, in Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139 (2d Cir.
1982) the Second Circuit held that stock in a business
corporation is expressly defined as a security under
federal law and rejected the “sale of business” excep
tion adopted by other circuits.

CPA Desires to Consult Without
Practicing: Florida Board Revokes
Certificate: Court Reverses
Board: Cenac v. Florida State
Board of Accountancy, 399 So. 2d
1013 (Fla. App. 1981).
Cenac, a Florida CPA, formed a corporation to con
sult on Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement and
informed the board, pursuant to statute, that he was
permitting his CPA certificate to be marked inopera
tive, thus exempting him from reestablishing his
competency. When he was asked if he was a CPA, he
would answer that he was “nonpracticing.” In finding
Cenac was practicing and revoking his license be
cause of rule violations, the board erroneously re
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jected the hearing officer’s finding that Cenac was not
holding himself out as a CPA. The court reversed and
remanded for an agency order consistent with the
hearing officer’s findings of fact. The court noted that
upon remand there must be adequate support for an
agency decision that Cenac was practicing public
accounting.
Soliciting Firm Clients in
Anticipation of Termination
Held Unfair Trade Practice:
Biever, Drees & Nordell v.
Coutts, 305 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1981).
While employed with the plaintiff CPA firm, the
defendant CPA conducted periodic audits of certain
Minnesota school districts. While still employed, he
contacted these clients and indicated that he, as an
individual, was interested in performing the audit
work and recounted his past experience with such
audits. At the time of this solicitation, he had not
informed the employer CPA firm that he was con
templating leaving nor that he was contacting clients
on his own behalf. There was no written nor oral
agreement as to how long the employment relation
was to continue.
After the employee’s voluntary termination in June
of 1979, the firm obtained a court order enjoining the
former employee from performing audit or other ser
vices for such clients through December 31, 1981. In
affirming the injunction, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that if an employee solicits the employer’s
customers in anticipation of starting a competing
business, the employer is entitled to an injunction for
a sufficient length of time to permit it to compete on
even terms.

Where Auditor Fails to Discover
Management Fraud, Landmark Case
Establishes Common Law Defense
to Suit by Client: Cenco Inc.
v. Seidman & Seidman
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 98,615 (7th Cir. 1982).
Cert. filed, No. 82-169, 7/29/82
This case involved Cenco’s claim against its auditor
based on common-law counts for breach of contract,
professional malpractice (negligence), and fraud.
Federal jurisdiction over the claim was based on the
court’s pendent jurisdiction in a federal class action
suit by stockholders, and the court applied Illinois
law in deciding the common-law counts. The trial
judge instructed the jury:
• acts of the corporation’s employees are acts of the
corporation itself if the employees were acting on
the corporation’s behalf,
(continued on page 7)
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• a breach of contract is excused if the promisee’s
hindrance or failure to cooperate prevented the per
formance,
• contributory negligence is a bar to negligence, and
• a participant in a fraud cannot recover damages
since there could have been no reliance upon the
fraudulent representations.
Based on the instructions the jury decided in favor
of the auditor and Cenco appealed. The appeals court
affirmed and held that the instructions were proper
since the uncontested facts showed that fraud had
permeated Genco’s top management.
Second Circuit Carves Out an
Accountant’s Work Product Privilege
to Protect Tax Accrual Working
Papers from IRS Scrutiny:
United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
The court balanced the policy needs of auditors for
a candid evaluation of potential tax liability and the

public policy needs for IRS access to information
relating to tax liability. It then carved out an accoun
tant’s work-product privilege to protect auditor’s tax
accrual workpapers from IRS summons except upon
a “sufficient showing of need to adequately justify
invading the integrity of the auditing process.”

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

How does our newsletter rate with you? Do you
know of a court decision or loss-prevention/riskmanagement technique that should be covered? Can
you offer better ideas than those we have discussed?
Please write the editor.
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